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[해외] ECB 총재 기자회견시 질의응답 초록(Q&A원문)

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Transcript of the questions asked and the answers given by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, and Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the ECB Question: Did you discuss the pace and timing of future rate hikes and, in that regard, I noticed that you say that you will be monitoring very closely the conditions moving forward. Previously, when you have used that phraseology, you have proceeded with an interest rate increase two meetings later. So, if in case your baseline scenario is confirmed, would it be a reasonable assumption to be looking toward October? Trichet: I stick to what I said in my introductory statement. As you heard, it is our sentiment that if our baseline scenario is confirmed, we will progressively withdraw the present monetary accommodation. That is clearly the way we are looking at the situation and also the way that observers are looking at the situation. I do not want to say anything else, but we will continue to monitor the situation very closely. I will not comment on your own hypothesis.Question: I like to try you again on that question: what was the flavour of the discussion on the Council today, are we more likely to see a step in two months or three months? My second question is: the Bank of England today raised interest rates somewhat unexpectedly. Do you think that markets and observers are in any way underestimating the threat inflation poses at the moment? And the extent to which central banks will raise rates to counter that? Trichet: I will not comment on the decision of the Bank of England, which happened to be on exactly the same day. As regards our own decision, it was not unexpected. And as regards the way we look at the future, it has been absolutely clear since the very beginning of our first move in December last year that we do not decide ex-ante future decisions over the medium run. I said that we were not pre-committed to any two months, three months or any kind of rhythm. I have always myself said that we depend on the confirmation of our baseline scenario, on facts and figures. We will see what will be the judgement of the Governing Council when the time comes. Again we are not pre-committed in any respect. We will do all what we judge appropriate, depending again on the wealth of information that we have, coming from our own analysis and the very impressive wealth of information and analysis from public and private institutions. As regards the position of central banks in general, as far as you refer not only to us, but to the community of central banks, I would say that we all consider that being credible in our mandate to deliver price stability not only on a short-term basis, but on the medium and long-term basis, and therefore, solidly anchoring inflationary expectations, is of the essence. It is the trust of all central banks I know, and certainly of those with which I am in permanent contact. It is of course, as you know well, our very strong belief. We have a mandate, we are faithful to our mandate and we believe that it is the best way to help growth to be sustainable and job creation which, very fortunately, is now visible, sustainable in the medium and long run.Question: If you compare the situation now to what we have observed at the last meeting, we had some encouraging data but we also had the conflict in the Middle East, would you – looking at the risks to price stability and growth –think the risks have increased or decreased for growth in recent weeks? And the same please for price stability? Trichet: As I said, we depend permanently on new information. I also mentioned the fact that we live in a world where uncertainty, and indeed great uncertainty, is unavoidable. This is particularly the case as regards the geopolitical risks that I mentioned. I would say that on a short to medium-term basis, the risks to growth are in our opinion balanced. On a longer-term horizon, we see a number of downward risks. That is the best summing-up of our present view. On the particular impact of geopolitical risks, I do not see, at this very moment that these have contributed in any significant fashion to hampering growth. But it is clearly a risk that has to be taken into consideration. Fortunately, I have not seen, and I hope strongly not to see, an impact of these events on global growth. Question: Three brief questions. After the last policy meeting, a lot of the ECB watchers shared the view that the Council would prefer to move gradually on interest rates, unless it was unavoidable. And to do so more frequently, if needed, than over a sharp interest rate move. Would you say that is a fair appraisal of the Governing Council’s sentiment? And the second question is: do you believe that concerns about financial stability or financial imbalances in the euro area have increased since the early months of this year? And, finally, you mentioned just now the moderation in M3 growth. I would just like to ask if you feel that is a sign in your view that policy changes are starting to take effect in the euro area? Trichet: On your first question, I already said, that we are not pre-committed in any respect. We do what we judge to be appropriate and necessary, and I think that the market has understood that pretty well. There is no particular rhythm of three or two months. We are not pre-committed as regards the frequency of our progressive withdrawal of monetary accommodation, if facts and figures confirm our baseline scenario. And we will continue to behave in this fashion.I will not comment on financial stability. I do not see any element that would be significant at this stage. On M3, as I said, we have observed a certain signal which, of course, is difficult to interpret at this time. The decisions we took since December as well as the fact that the market is anticipating our decisions, and that the yield curve is showing an upward trend, all this has played a role. Is it a sufficiently significant influence to trigger what we are observing now and marks the beginning of a deceleration? We will see. Of course, I prefer what we have observed n the last statistics to the previous evolution. Note the figures are still very impressive. When you look at the figures we have, particularly as regards loans to the private sector, loans to non-financial corporations – which are increasing at a pace of 11.5% in June, compared with 11.3% in May – we still have very strong dynamics. And the pace continues to increase as regards that particular segment of loans, even if loans to the private sector in general decreased slightly to 11% in June from 11.4% in May. But again it is something that we will continue to look at very carefully. Look at the components of M3. Look at its counterparts. And better understand all the dynamics that are at stake. Again I will not, at this stage, say “we now clearly see the first signs that what we have been doing in increasing our interest rates is working”. But our policy changes are, of course, playing a role because the interest rates applied by the banks that are granting those loans are rising. Question: I have two brief questions. First, I wonder if you can tell us whether the decision today was unanimous? And, secondly, you have just stressed the Bank’s mandate of price stability. But projections, including the Eurosystem’s own, forecast that growth will slow down in 2007. So I wonder whether you can tell us whether there has been a discussion of a situation in which you have simultaneously rising inflation pressures and slowing growth, and what that discussion was like? Trichet: First of all, the decision in favour of a 25 basis point increase today was overwhelmingly supported by the Governing Council. As regards our assessment on the risks to price stability and to growth I have told you clearly that we saw the risks to price stability over the short, medium and long term to be on the upside. We consider the risks for growth to be balanced, on a short to medium-term basis, and to be on the downside over the longer term. That is our present analysis. That being said our mandate is clear. We have to deliver price stability. It is not only the mandate given to us by the Treaty but also our responsibility vis-à-vis the households of Europe and the fellow citizens of Europe, who expect us to deliver price stability. It is also the working assumption of the social partners. And this is the reason why we tell them: be responsible yourself, because we will take care of price stability. It is also essential because it is through our credibility that we anchor inflationary expectations. As I said in my introductory statement in the euro area we have long-term rates that are favourable to sustainable growth and sustainable job creation, in particular, because we are solidly anchoring inflationary expectations. We see no contradiction between our mandate and sustainable growth and sustainable job creation.Question: Could you give us the flavour of your thinking regarding the pass-through of past oil price rises and commodity price rises in general through the price chain, whatever you want to call it. There has been some evidence in the surveys that this is creeping closer to the consumer, but perhaps this is not quite there yet. My second question is on the fiscal side of things. I wonder if you could just elaborate a little bit on your point of needing change on the expenditure side. My understanding of the fiscal structures of the Stability Pact was always that this was one area where governments preserved, and indeed deserved, their leeway as to how they chose to balance their budgets. It surprises me somewhat that you appear to be telling euro area governments that they should not raise taxes, that they should cut spending. And my third question is just a very small factual one. I realise that Slovenia is a very small new member of the euro area. But does this have any sort of one-off effect on the statistics or what one observes on the economic activity in the euro area as a whole, since its composition is changing, however slightly. Trichet: On the first point, I mentioned the risks that we saw to prices and I mentioned a number of those risks – such as the increase in the price of oil – which we have observed in the past, unfortunately, I have to say, and which are still a risk. I mentioned additional increases in prices – I am not mentioning past increases that have already been decided and fully incorporated in our own projections, but rather the possible future increases in administrative prices and indirect taxes – and I mentioned the traditional – in this press conference – second-round effects, in particular wages and salaries increases. There is also the point which you have mentioned, which we consider ourselves to be very important and which has to be examined very carefully, namely what we call a stronger than currently anticipated pass-through of past oil prices and I could add of past commodity prices. There are increases in input prices that do not materialise immediately in increases in output prices, in manufacturing goods or in the services prices concerned, but this process is going on, on a continuing basis and that is something which has to be followed very carefully. That would be my comment on your first question. Just because you don’t see an immediate effect, an immediate mechanistic effect of these increases in oil and commodities prices, that does not mean that you do not have in the pipeline costs that would push prices up later on. This is difference from the second-round effects.On the fiscal side, I would only say that we have always told our interlocutors, the Commission and the executive branches, that in delivering the appropriate fiscal position required by the Stability and Growth Pact, in an overwhelming majority of cases, to be as sound and reasonable as possible on the expenditure side is the first best option. Then, if something remains to be done, in order to meet this Stability and Growth Pact requirement, you have to do what remains necessary on the receipt side namely taxation. But the first best option is always to have a sound handling of the expenditure side. There is nothing new there; we have always said that. And I have to say, that it is particularly true in the euro area, where the level of public expenditure – public spending as a proportion of GDP – is quite significantly higher than the OECD average or the G7 average. So we have to be fully conscious of that structural difference. As regards Slovenia, of course we are very happy to be enlarging the euro area and we will have a fully fledged set of statistics that will permit a full comparison of what happens from 1 January next year with what has happened before. So, you’ll have all possibilities to compare statistics of the highest quality on a state of the art professional basis. But allow me to stress that we had an important message in relation with Slovenia. Perhaps you have noticed that we’ve said that we will be, when next year starts, in a euro area with 13 economies instead of 12 sharing a common destiny with a single currency. We consider that it would be very opportune for labour mobility between Slovenia and the European Union and in particular with all the members of the euro area, to be totally free without barriers within a single market area with a single currency, full labour mobility is absolutely necessary. Question: Mr Trichet, I have two questions. You said that there was an overwhelming majority in favour of the decision you made today in the Governing Council. I take from that word that there were perhaps two or three members who might have preferred, at least at the start of the discussion, another decision. What did they want? Did these members not want to move at all with a rate hike today or did they prefer to have a larger hike? Trichet: Let me be more precise. By “overwhelming majority” I meant a fully-fledged consensus. There were no other views on today’s decision. Question: The second question I have relates to the economic outlook in the short and medium term and then the medium to longer term. There are a lot of economists seeing that there might be some kind of cooling down in the euro area economy. Do you have a discussion in the Governing Council – assuming that you want to normalise interest rates, whatever you regard as a normal level – do you have a discussion in the Council that the time is running out for interest rate hikes? Trichet: First of all, the “normal level” for us is the level which permits us to deliver price stability over time, be credible in the delivery of price stability over time and solidly anchor inflationary expectations. There is our compass and the needle of the compass. Second, as I have said very often, we are pragmatic. Everybody knows what our definition of price stability is. Everybody knows what our determination is. Everybody knows what our two-pillar monetary policy strategy is. Now, we will do what is necessary, depending on facts and figures and new events. At this stage, I will not comment further. Of course, we will have new projections, as you might expect. We have our present projections. We have our baseline scenario and we might have a lot of new events – price of oil, geopolitical uncertainty, also good surprises that we might have in the rest of the world. We could also be – I do not exclude that at all – surprised by the dynamism of the domestic economy of the euro area. We have a number – as you know very well, better than anybody – of survey indicators that are very impressive and that are still not materialising fully – particularly in the service sector, where the survey indicators are much better than the present so-called hard figures. I do not believe that hard figures are the only reliable figures or that survey figures are the only reliable figures. We have to make the best out of this wealth of information, but it is clear that there are areas where we could have good surprises. Again, even if I said that our own sentiment for growth was balanced on a short-term basis, it means that we have downside risks on the one hand, but we have also upside chances on the other hand. And we have to take that into consideration also. That being said, you can count on us to do what we judge necessary. If our baseline scenario is confirmed, if our assumptions are confirmed, then we will progressively withdraw monetary accommodation. Question: Mr President, you mentioned that the euro area will grow around a potential rate? Can you define “potential rate”? The potential rate was, in former days, at the beginning of the euro area eight years ago, approximately 2 ½ %. Some economists said that it is lower now. What is necessary to increase this rate? And what is the defined “potential rate” you have mentioned without giving a figure? Because the potential rate was, in former days, a very important number for anchoring price stability; I remember the “M3 reference value”. Trichet: You know that there are a number of analyses which do not converge in the direction of an overall consensus on our growth potential. And you have also to distinguish the short-term growth potential, and the medium and long-term growth potential. Let me first address the very important issue of labour productivity increases. I would like to take advantage of your question, which is extraordinarily important, to mention the fact that our main handicap in terms of growth potential remains the fact that productivity growth is much too small in the euro area. During the last five years, say, we have been at a level which is half the level observed in the United States in terms yearly increase of labour productivity and which is also half the level observed in the economies of the euro area in the eighties. If we were at the level that we had in the eighties, or if we were at the level which is presently posted by the United States, we would have a growth potential which would be significantly higher. This is the reason why we are calling for structural reforms, because we firmly believe that it is the lack of structural reforms particularly in a period of very rapid changes in science, technology, and globalisation, that explains why we have a disappointing level of increase of labour productivity. That being said, you asked for figures. We will not underwrite any figures ourselves. But I can mention a number of studies which suggest that, for the euro area as a whole, we could be at the level of 1.9%. Others suggest that we are in-between 2% and 2.5%, but possibly much closer to 2% than to 2.5%. You have a number of such analyses. And again, I will not underwrite any figures, but I would say that if you said in the present situation that perhaps 2% might be an order of magnitude it would not necessarily be absurd. But, again, one has to accept there are various methodologies, various views – short-term and more medium and long-term. In any case, our growth potential should be much higher. It is not a parameter which is fixed and immobile. It depends on what we do. And it can be much higher. Question: Do you remember your dinner speech on 31 March at the IIF meeting in Zurich? There you mentioned a figure: was it 1.8 or 1.9? Trichet: My memory is that I mentioned a figure of around 1.9.Question: You referred to the survey data that has been relatively good. However, some of it has started to soften a little bit, to come off the peaks. Has the business cycle in the euro zone peaked? And secondly, on budget consolidation, we have numbers from Germany and some numbers from Italy, and economists are starting to estimate what impact this will have on growth in 2007. The estimates range between 0.5 and 1.3 – those that I have seen – in terms of reducing GDP growth next year. What is your estimate of what impact fiscal consolidation could have next year? Trichet: Taking the second question first. You know that we consider that fiscal consolidation – at the present level of the risks and dangers that exist in the various economies of the euro area today – is improving the confidence of entrepreneurs, the confidence of economic agents in general and the confidence of households. All the mechanistic computations that would go through mechanistic models are not necessarily reliable, because they do not take into account what I would call the Ricardian channel. Never forget that, when you are credible in a medium-term path of fiscal consolidation, you are improving confidence. And confidence is one of the ingredients that is decisive to foster growth: fortunately, we are in an episode of improving confidence in Europe. On your first question, I would say that we are totally pragmatic: we will see what happens. I have no judgement on whether some survey indicators have peaked or not. I have mentioned that, particularly in the domain of services, we still see a large gap between the level of survey indicators, which is very flattering and very encouraging, and the level of the so-called hard figures. My intuition is that the hard figures themselves will go up. But we will see what happens, and again, we have to be cautious. Reality is reality, facts are facts, and we have to be humble in front of facts. Therefore I have no comment on whether some survey indicators have peaked or not. But, as you know, some of them are at historical levels which are very flattering. Question: You said in today’s statement that rates are still accommodative and that the further withdrawal of accommodation will be warranted if your main scenario continues to be confirmed. The markets are debating whether rates will reach 3.25% or 3.5% by the end of the year. It sounds from today’s comments very much like you still see some room to move; it does not sound like there is an imminent end to your tightening cycle. I wonder if you could give us your opinion on whether you see that there is some way to go before rates are no longer accommodative. Trichet: Again, I have said all I have to say on that. I can only confirm to you that, if our scenario and our assumptions are confirmed, there will be a progressive alleviation of the monetary accommodation that exists today. I have said that for quite a period of time, and you can see what we have been doing.Let me also mention something which has been discussed in the Governing Council, namely the Doha round. You did not ask many questions on this issue but it is a very important for us. We have always said that a positive conclusion of this round was of the essence. The fact that we are in a difficult episode is something that we follow very carefully. We consider that it is one of the risks that I have constantly mentioned. I would call on all governments concerned to be fully aware of what is at stake in this round of negotiations to make their best efforts to cope with the current difficulties and to find a solution.

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[2026 대전망] '달러 시대의 느린 균열' [시드니=뉴스핌] 권지언 특파원 = 2026년 글로벌 자산시장 지형은 조용하지만 분명하게 바뀔 모양새다. 월가 주요 IB와 글로벌 운용사들이 제시한 내년 전망을 종합하면, 핵심 키워드는 ▲약해지는 달러 ▲강해지는 금 ▲제도권에 깊숙이 편입되는 코인 ▲전략자산으로 격상된 원자재로 압축된다. 기축통화로서 달러의 지위는 유지되지만, 각종 정책·재정·지정학 리스크로 인해 달러 의존도를 낮추는 '조용한 탈출(quiet hedging)'이 진행 중이라는 분석이다. [사진=퍼플렉시티 생성 이미지] ◆ 달러: 패권은 유지되지만 '천천히 새는 배' 2026년 달러를 둘러싼 큰 그림은 '완만한 약세' 흐름 속에서, 기축통화 패권은 유지하되 매력은 서서히 떨어지는 구조다. 여기에 연준의 금리 인하 경로, 주요국과의 금리 격차, 글로벌 성장·정책 리스크, 그리고 디달러라이제이션(de-dollarization, 탈달) 흐름이 겹치며 달러의 방향성을 좌우할 전망이다. 먼저 연준의 완화 경로를 살펴보면, 2026년 말 기준금리는 약 3%대 중반(3.4% 안팎)까지 내려갈 것이란 전망이 우세하다. 다만 최근 발언들을 종합하면 인하 속도는 초기 시장 기대보다 더 느리고 신중한 방향으로 조정되고 있어, 지나친 달러 약세를 막아주는 '하방 안전판' 역할을 하고 있다는 평가다. 둘째는 금리 격차다. 연준이 금리를 내리더라도, 정책금리는 유럽중앙은행(ECB)의 2%, 영란은행(BoE)의 2~3% 수준보다 여전히 높은 수준이 유지될 것으로 예상된다. 수익률 격차가 과거만큼 크지는 않지만, 달러 자산이 어느 정도 금리 메리트를 제공하는 만큼 "달러가 한 방향으로 급락하는 구도"까지 보긴 어렵다는 진단이다. 이 같은 상대 금리 우위는 2026년 내내 달러가 급격히 무너지는 것을 막는 완충장치로 작용할 수 있다. 셋째는 글로벌 성장과 정책 리스크다. IMF는 2026년 세계 경제가 완만하게 성장세를 개선할 것으로 보고 있어, 극단적인 안전자산 선호가 달러로만 몰리는 환경은 아닐 것이라는 전망에 힘이 실린다. 다만 미국의 정치·재정 이슈, 부채한도·재정적자, 무역·관세 정책을 둘러싼 불확실성은 여전히 "달러 방향성을 뒤흔들 수 있는 변수"로 남아 있으며, 상황에 따라 달러에 일시적인 강세·약세 충격을 모두 줄 수 있는 요인들이다. 장기 구조 측면에서 보면, 달러는 '패권은 유지되지만, 천천히 새는 배'에 가깝다. BNY멜론, JP모간, UBS, 냇웨스트, 피델리티 등 주요 글로벌 하우스들은 공통적으로 "달러의 기축통화 지위는 당분간 흔들리지 않는다"는 데 의견을 같이한다. 그러나 무역정책 불확실성, 미국의 재정적자 확대, 연준의 완화적 기조 등 구조적 요인들이 달러의 매력을 조금씩 갉아먹는 국면으로 진입했다는 데도 큰 이견이 없다. 국제통화기금(IMF) 통계에 따르면 전 세계 외환보유액에서 달러 비중은 2000년대 초반 70%대에서 2025년 2분기 56% 수준까지 떨어졌다. 냇웨스트와 피델리티는 이 흐름을 "빠르진 않지만 분명한 디달러라이제이션(de-dollarization)"으로 규정한다. 특히 러시아 준비자산 동결 이후 커진 '제재 리스크'는 여러 국가가 결제·준비자산을 다변화하도록 자극한 대표적 계기로 지목되며, 일부 중앙은행은 준비자산 구성에서 달러 비중을 줄이고 금·기타 통화 비중을 확대하는 방향으로 움직이고 있다. 이런 전제 아래에서 보면 달러는 2026년 전반적으로는 약세 쪽으로 기울지만, 중간중간 강한 반등(숏 커버 랠리)이 나올 수 있다는 시나리오가 설득력을 얻는다. 물가가 예상보다 끈질기게 높은 수준을 유지하거나 예상 밖의 인플레이션 급등이 나타날 경우 연준의 추가 인하가 지연되면서 달러에 단기적인 지지 요인으로 작용할 수 있다. 여기에 지정학적 충돌, 금융시장 급락 같은 글로벌 리스크오프 이벤트가 겹치면 '안전자산 달러' 선호가 살아나면서 강세 국면이 일시적으로 재현될 가능성도 크다. 시장에서는 이 같은 조건이 맞아떨어질 수 있는 시점을 2026년 3~6월 구간으로 보는 시각이 적지 않다. 연준의 주요 회의와 핵심 물가·고용 지표 발표가 몰려 있는 만큼, 상반기 중 일정 구간에서는 "완만한 약세 추세 속 달러 반등 구간"이 열릴 수 있다는 전망이다. 결국 2026년 달러는 방향성으로는 완만한 약세, 경로상으로는 구간별 반등이 섞인 '요철 있는 하향 곡선'에 가까운 그림으로 그려지고 있다. 달러지수 내년 전망 [사진=캠브리지 커런시스] ◆ 금: 탈달러·재정악화·지정학이 만든 '슈퍼 헤지' 월가 IB들이 그리는 2026년 금 가격의 큰 그림은 '상승'에서 '초강세'까지, 방향성이 한쪽으로 모여 있다. JP모간은 2025년 말 온스당 3,600달러대에서 2026년에는 4,000달러를 넘어설 수 있다는 전망을 내놓고, 일부 프라이빗 뷰에서는 5,000달러 안팎까지 거론한다. 골드만삭스·UBS 등도 4,000~4,500달러 구간을 기본 밴드로 제시하면서, 구조적 강세장이 이어질 경우 5,000달러 돌파 가능성까지 열어두는 분위기다. 이 같은 '슈퍼 헤지' 논리는 세 축에 기대고 있다. 첫째, 중앙은행의 공격적인 금 매수와 디달러라이제이션 흐름이다. 러시아 준비자산 동결 이후 "제재로 묶이지 않는 준비자산"을 찾는 움직임이 강화되면서, 다수 중앙은행이 외환보유액에서 달러·유로 비중을 줄이고 금 비중을 늘리는 방향으로 서서히 포트폴리오를 바꾸고 있다. 둘째, 미국을 비롯한 글로벌 재정악화와 부채 누적이다. 천문학적 정부부채와 확대된 재정적자는 통화가치 희석 우려를 키우며 "법정통화의 거울"로서 금의 역할을 다시 부각시키고 있다. 셋째, 연준의 완화 전환과 약달러 구도다. 금리가 내려가면 무이자 자산인 금의 기회비용이 줄고, 달러 약세는 달러 표시 금 가격을 끌어올리는 이중 효과를 낳는다. 기관투자가들의 인식도 이를 뒷받침한다. 나티시스 설문에서 글로벌 기관의 3분의 2는 "2026년에는 금이 코인보다 더 나은 성과를 낼 것"이라고 답하며 금을 1순위 방어자산으로 꼽았다. 동시에 상당수 기관이 전통적인 60:40 포트폴리오 대신 인프라·부동산·원자재·금 등을 섞은 60:20:20 구조를 선호한다고 응답해, 금과 실물자산을 "인플레이션·재정·지정학 리스크가 겹친 시대의 전략자산"으로 재평가하고 있음을 보여준다. 다만 IB들은 2025년 급등 뒤 2026년 일부 구간에서 단기 조정과 높은 변동성은 불가피하다고 보면서도, 조정이 나오더라도 "고점을 한 단계 올리는 조정"이라는 표현을 쓰며 중장기 방향성만큼은 강하게 위를 가리키고 있다. ◆ 코인: '대체 가치 저장 수단'...그러나 여전히 '실험 구역' 코인에 대한 월가의 시각은 한 줄로 "커진 건 맞지만, 아직은 실험 구역"이다. JP모간은 비트코인을 포함한 디지털 자산을 "달러에 대한 또 하나의 도전자"라고 부르면서도, 극단적인 변동성과 짧은 히스토리를 이유로 전략적 코어 자산이 아니라 위성(satellite) 성격의 위험자산으로 다뤄야 한다고 경고한다. 2024년 초 2조달러 수준이던 크립토 전체 시가총액이 2025년에는 4조달러 안팎까지 불어난 가운데, 규제 환경이 ETF·ETP 승인 등으로 제도권 친화적으로 바뀌며 비트코인을 '가치 저장 수단'으로 보는 시각이 늘고 있는 것도 사실이다. 다만 실제 결제·상거래 규모는 여전히 수백억 달러 수준에 머물며, 일상적 화폐나 결제 인프라로서의 역할은 초기 단계라는 점이 반복해서 지적된다.​ UBS와 같은 보수적인 하우스는 이런 변화를 인정하면서도 "코인은 어디까지나 투기적 자산"이라는 입장을 고수한다. UBS CIO는 비트코인 변동성이 연 70~80% 수준으로 전통 자산 대비 현저히 높고, 70% 이상 급락하는 대형 조정이 여러 차례 반복된 탓에 포트폴리오의 전략적 축으로 편입하긴 어렵다고 본다. 대신 장기 잠재력을 믿는 투자자라면 "완전 손실이 나도 전체 계획이 흔들리지 않을 정도의 극소 비중으로, 장기 보유하는 전략" 정도만 고려하라고 조언한다. 반대로 SSGA나 모간스탠리, 반에크 등 디지털 자산에 우호적인 기관들은 비트코인이 전통 자산과의 상관관계가 낮고 장기 위험조정 수익이 높다는 점을 들어, 1~4% 수준의 소규모 전략적 배분이 포트폴리오 다변화에 기여할 수 있다는 분석을 내놓는다.​ 기관 머니의 온도차도 뚜렷하다. 나티시스 2026 인스티튜셔널 서베이에 따르면 글로벌 기관의 36%는 향후 크립토 투자 비중을 늘릴 계획이라고 답하지만, 동시에 66%는 "2026년 성과는 금이 크립토를 이길 것"이라고 응답했다. EY·코인베이스가 2025년 초 실시한 설문에서도 응답 기관의 59%가 "AUM의 5% 이상을 디지털 자산에 배분할 계획"이라고 답해 성장 잠재력을 보여줬지만, 가장 큰 우려 요인으로 여전히 변동성과 규제 리스크를 꼽았다. ◆ 원자재: AI·에너지 전환·안보가 만든 '전략자산'의 귀환 2026년 원자재 시장은 더 이상 단순한 인플레이션 헤지가 아니라, AI·에너지 전환·안보 이슈가 맞물린 '전략자산'으로 재조명되고 있다. BNY멜론, JP모간, UBS, 냇웨스트, 피델리티 리포트는 접근법은 조금씩 다르지만, 공통적으로 원자재·에너지·전환 메탈에 구조적인 강세 요인이 집중되고 있다는 점을 강조한다. BNY멜론은 AI 데이터센터 구축, 전력 인프라 확충, 에너지 전환과 함께 각국의 방위·인프라 지출이 향후 수년간 원자재 수요를 떠받칠 것이라고 본다. JP모간은 천연가스와 전력을 "AI 혁명의 병목(bottleneck)"으로 규정하며 가스 발전, LNG 프로젝트, 송전망 등에 장기 투자 기회가 많다고 짚었다. UBS는 구리·알루미늄 등 산업금속 비중 확대를, 냇웨스트는 희토류·전략자원이 '공급망 안보'와 직결되면서 지정학적 중요성이 커질 것이라고 제시하고, 피델리티는 구조적으로 높은 인플레이션 환경에서 실물자산·절대수익 전략이 전통 60:40 포트폴리오의 필수 보완재가 된다고 분석했다. 나티시스 설문에서도 기관투자가의 65%가 전통 60:40 대신 인프라·부동산·원자재·금 등을 섞은 60:20:20 구조가 2026년에 더 높은 수익을 낼 것이라고 답해, 원자재·실물자산을 '필수 축'으로 보는 인식 전환이 확인된다.​ 블룸버그NEF와 IEA 자료를 인용한 보고서들은 AI 데이터센터와 전력망 확충 수요만으로도 2030년까지 전 세계 구리 수요의 2~3%포인트 추가 상향을 가져올 수 있다고 추정한다. AI 데이터센터는 단일 시설당 수만 톤 단위의 구리와 막대한 전력을 소모하는 만큼, 이미 공급 부족이 우려되는 구리·은·희토류·갈륨 등 핵심 금속 시장에 추가적인 타이트닝 요인으로 작용할 수 있다는 것이다. 여기에 전기차·배터리·재생에너지 확대로 리튬·니켈·코발트 등 전환 메탈 수요가 2026년 한 해에만 30~40% 급증할 수 있다는 전망도 나오고 있어, 에너지 전환과 AI가 결합된 새로운 '미니 슈퍼사이클' 가능성이 거론된다.​ 인플레이션·무역·정책 측면에서의 환경도 원자재에 우호적이다. 모간스탠리 등은 미국·유럽에서 관세·보호무역 정책이 상수로 남는 한, 명목 물가가 2%를 상회하는 기간이 길어질 수 있다고 경고하면서, 과거 데이터상 인플레이션이 2%를 넘는 구간에서 원자재 상품 수익률이 평균적으로 기타 자산 대비 20%포인트가량 우위였다고 지적했다. 동시에 에너지 안보 우려와 탄소 규제가 섞이면서, 가스·LNG·원유·우라늄은 "절대 줄일 수 없는 베이스 에너지"로, 구리·알루미늄·리튬·희토류는 "에너지 전환을 위한 전략 금속"으로 포지셔닝이 재정의되고 있다. 이런 환경 속에서 월가 IB와 기관투자가들은 2026년 포트폴리오에서 원자재 비중을 한 단계 높이는 전략을, "달러·채권·전통 주식만으로는 감당하기 어려운 에너지·인플레이션·안보 리스크를 헷지하는 가장 실질적인 방법"으로 제시했다. kwonjiun@newspim.com 2025-12-15 07:12
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李대통령, 전재수 장관 면직안 재가 [서울=뉴스핌] 박찬제 기자 = 이재명 대통령이 11일 '통일교 금품수수' 의혹을 받는 전재수 해양수산부 장관에 대한 면직안을 재가했다. 대통령실 대변인실은 이날 오후 언론 공지를 통해 "이재명 대통령은 전재수 해양수산부 장관에 대한 면직안을 재가했다"고 밝혔다. [영종도=뉴스핌] 김학선 기자 = 통일교로부터 금품을 받았다는 의혹이 제기된 전재수 해양수산부 장관이 11일 오전 'UN해양총회' 유치 활동을 마친 후 인천국제공항 제2여객터미널을 통해 귀국해 입장을 밝힌 후 공항을 나서고 있다. 전 장관은 "직을 내려놓고 허위사실 의혹을 밝힐 것"이라고 밝혔다. 2025.12.11 yooksa@newspim.com 통일교 측으로부터 금품을 받았다는 의혹이 불거진 전 장관은 앞서 "장관직을 내려놓고 당당하게 응하는 것이 공직자로서 해야 할 처신"이라며 사의를 표명했다. 전 장관은 이날 오전 인천국제공항으로 입국하면서 기자들과 만나 '통일교 금품 수수 의혹'에 대해 "전혀 사실무근"이라면서도 사의를 밝혔다. 그는 "흔들림 없이 일할 수 있도록 제가 해수부 장관직을 내려놓는 것이 온당하지 않을까 생각한다"고 밝혔다. 전 장관은 의혹에 대해 "전혀 사실무근이고, 불법적인 금품수수는 단언컨대 없었다"며 "추후 수사 형태든지, 아니면 제가 여러 가지 것들 종합해서 국민들께 말씀드리거나 기자간담회를 통해 밝혀질 것"이라고 강조했다. 전 장관은 "(통일교 측으로부터)10원짜리 하나 불법적으로 받은 사실이 없다"면서 "600명이 모인 장소에서 축사를 했다는 것도 사실무근"이라고 반박했다. 앞서 민중기 특별검사팀은 지난 8월 윤영호 전 통일교 세계본부장으로부터 2018∼2020년께 전재수 당시 더불어민주당 의원에게 명품 시계 2개와 함께 수천만 원을 제공했다는 취지로 진술한 것으로 전해졌다. 그러면서 한일 해저터널 추진 등 교단 숙원사업 청탁성이라고 설명한 것으로 알려졌다. pcjay@newspim.com 2025-12-11 17:14
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