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Richard W. Fisher

The Dog That Does Not Bark but Packs a Big Bite: Services in the U.S. Economy

Remarks before the U.S.–China Business Council, the Coalition of Service Industries and the American Council of Life Insurers
Washington, D.C.
May 14, 2007

Peter Ustinov, the great actor, used to chide the British foreign service by saying he was “convinced there is a small room in the attic of the Foreign Office where future diplomats are taught to stammer.” We do not stammer at the Fed, but we have been known to mumble on occasion. In most central banks, there has traditionally been a premium paid for being opaque.

Alas, obscurity is not our privilege in the reality show that is today’s financial world.

The conduct of monetary policy is inherently a forward-looking exercise: The Fed sets policy with the goal of holding future inflation at a reasonable minimum while helping economic activity and employment grow at maximum sustainable rates. To do so, the Fed must consider both current and expected inflation and growth. A certain degree of transparency and clarity helps increasingly sophisticated business and financial market operators manage risk. Mindful that our actions and deeds condition the expectations of risk takers, it makes sense for central bankers to provide context for our decisions.

This evening, I would like to give you a little perspective from my perch at the Dallas Fed. I would like to talk, hopefully with nary a mumble nor stammer, about the service sector and what I consider the consequences of having services, rather than manufacturing, as the driving force of our economy. These views are my own and, I hasten to add, do not necessarily reflect the views of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee.

First, let me give you some facts to set the stage. America’s economy is a behemoth. In 2005, the Dallas district of the Federal Reserve System—all of Texas, 26 parishes in Louisiana and 18 counties in New Mexico—produced 25 percent more output than India in dollar terms. The Twelfth District, headquartered in San Francisco and overseen by my colleague Janet Yellen, produced more output than all of China. The 140 million workers in the United States produce over $13.2 trillion in economic output; 82 percent of those 140 million workers are employed in the service sector, producing 70 percent of our GDP.

Over the decades, the inexorable forces of capitalist evolution have shifted our economic base from agriculture to manufacturing and now to services. The iconic economist Joseph Schumpeter wrote that “stabilized capitalism is a contradiction in terms.” The transformation of the American economic landscape over time is testimony to our ability to harness our innovative, educated and entrepreneurial culture to master—rather than be victimized by—the instability that is inherent in capitalism. Since the first risk takers arrived on the shores of Virginia and at Plymouth Rock, it has been in our DNA to climb up the value-added ladder. A little history:

* Two hundred years ago, over 90 percent of the U.S. workforce was in agriculture. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, that share had shrunk to 37 percent of the workforce. Today, less than 1.5 percent of America’s labor pool works on farms and ranches—yet we are producing an agricultural abundance.
* Two hundred years ago, 4 percent of our labor force worked in industry, which includes manufacturing, construction and mining. By 1900, the figure had grown to 28 percent, on its way to peaking at around 38 percent in the 1950s and ’60s. Today, traditional industry employs just 16 percent of our fellow workers—and we’re producing more goods than ever.
* Two hundred years ago, 4 percent of the workforce was in services. The percentage of service workers has steadily grown, reaching 26 percent in 1900, passing 50 percent in the 1950s and, as I mentioned earlier, employing 82 percent of our workforce today.

Let me put these numbers in perspective for you by contrasting them with China. Today, about 44 percent of China’s working population is still in agriculture, compared with America’s 2 percent. Employment in the Chinese industrial sector is 23 percent, compared with our 16 percent. China’s service sector employs a little bit more than 30 percent of China’s laborers, compared with our 82 percent. In other words, China’s labor distribution between agriculture, industry and services is about the same as ours was in 1900.

Since the demise of Mao, the Chinese have made great strides in improving their education system. They are producing graduates in prodigious quantities. And yet they are a long way from having the quality educational system needed to produce trained workers capable of rivaling ours. Around 15 percent of China’s population aged 25–65 has a high school degree, compared with 85 percent in the United States. One of every 20 Chinese in that age group has a college degree, compared with one in three in the U.S. In China, 700 people out of every million are R&D researchers. Here, that number is at least 6.5 times higher.

And in terms of wealth, it is interesting to note that China’s real GDP per capita is roughly 1/25th the size of ours, about the same level as what the U.S. achieved over a century ago.

Our per capita wealth has grown as we’ve moved up the value-added ladder. Generally speaking, our highest paying jobs are in services—engineers, scientists, computer systems analysts, stock brokers, professors, doctors, lawyers, dentists, CPAs, entertainers and other service providers, to say nothing of the mega-compensation paid to hedge fund managers and financial engineers.

Beginning in 1993, the average wage for private services employees surpassed base industry wages. By 1999, all nonretail services employees, even public service employees like government workers and teachers, were averaging more pay per hour than industrial workers.

The destructive side of the process of capitalism’s “creative destruction” is evident in the numbers as old professions give way to new, higher-paying ones. The number of U.S. farm laborers decreased 20 percent between 1992 and 2002. In the same 10-year time frame, employment of telephone operators decreased 45 percent. That of sewing machine operators decreased 50 percent between 1992 and 2002. This is not ancient history; this all occurred within a time frame that is fresh in the memory of everyone in this room.

Yet within that same time frame—between 1992 and 2002—the number of architects grew 44 percent, legal assistants 66 percent and financial services employees 78 percent. Today, there are nearly a million webmaster jobs, a category that didn’t even exist until the early 1990s. The creative side of creative destruction has replaced lost jobs in declining sectors with new ones in emerging sectors.

Since 1992, the goods-producing sector has seen its share of nonfarm payrolls fall by 3.9 percentage points. However, the losses have been more than offset by job gains in just three service sectors—professional and business services, health care, and leisure and hospitality.

Today, manufacturing employs one of 10 U.S. workers, about the same number as the leisure and hospitality sector. One in 20 works in construction—fewer than in financial services. Nearly the same number of people work in government as in the goods-producing sector as a whole. In the past year, the number of manufacturing jobs shrank by 1 percent. In contrast, employment grew by around 3 percent in education, health care, and leisure and hospitality and by over 5 percent in professional services.

Here is a statistic that about beats all: At the end of 2005, the U.S. auto and auto parts manufacturing industry employed about 1.1 million workers and added 0.8 percent of the value to our GDP. The legal services sector employed nearly the same number, but contributed 1.5 percent of the value added to GDP. I will resist the temptation to make a lawyer joke because this is no laughing matter to economists: The legal services industry provides as many jobs as auto manufacturers but contributes nearly twice the value-added to our economic output.

I think you get the point: The service sector, not autos and other forms of traditional manufacturing, drives our economy. And will continue doing so.

Looking forward, the Department of Commerce projects that the fastest growing jobs between now and 2014 will be among general managers, health care workers, postsecondary teachers, retail salespeople, customer service reps and other service providers. In contrast, among the jobs with the greatest projected decline will be textile plant workers, machine operators, farmers and ranchers, meter readers, computer and telephone operators, typists, couriers and, to the relief of all families who like to sit down to supper undisturbed, telemarketers and door-to-door salespeople.

The shift of jobs away from the goods and lower-value-added service sectors to higher-end services is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, it is part of a longer term trend of employment moving to sectors that produce for an increasingly wealthy country, meet the health care needs of our aging population, and provide U.S. employers with the highly trained and flexible workers they need in a broader, more accessible global economy brimming with unskilled labor.

As people get richer, they shift their spending toward relatively more services. Evidence can be found in the buying patterns of U.S. households, in the historical timeline of the U.S. economy and in nations around the world. For every dollar Americans spend on goods, we spend $1.70 on services—roughly a 60 percent mix in favor of services. In contrast, China spends 58 percent of its consumption on goods versus 42 percent on services. In even poorer India, services represent just 37 percent of spending—the reverse image of the U.S.

In 1979, I was a young member of the U.S. delegation President Carter sent to China to settle the claims left after Mao’s government seized the railroad rolling stock we had lent Chiang Kai-shek. President Nixon had normalized political relations in the early 1970s, but it fell to President Carter to normalize economic relations and finally raise the flag at the U.S. Embassy.

So that we could begin to trade with each other and get on with a normal relationship, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal was dispatched to negotiate with Deng Xiaoping. I was Blumenthal’s assistant, so I accompanied him to all his meetings with the Chinese leader. I will never forget our first meeting with Deng. He was electrifying. You may remember he was a short fellow—barely 5 feet, if memory serves—but he was a giant of a man with big dreams. In our first meeting, he entered the room and cackled, “Where are these big American capitalists I am supposed to be so afraid of?”

He then laid out his vision of driving China down “the capitalist road,” a plan he did not proclaim publicly until later. Deng told us then that he would unleash the Chinese genius and focus it on development and modernization. To him, when it came to ideologies, it didn’t “matter whether it is a yellow cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice.”

We all know the Chinese have caught economic mice in droves. Since 1979, China reports having grown at better than 9.6 percent a year, adding up to a better-than tenfold expansion of the economy to date. China’s factories produced 200 room air conditioners in 1978; today, they claim to make 79 million a year. Back in the dark old days of rigid central planning, the Chinese produced 679,000 tons of plastics; last year, they were up to 25 million tons—37 times as much. In 2003, China turned out 260 billion more square feet of cloth than it did in 1978. Today’s great building boom is occurring in China, where their government reported 38 billion square feet of floor space was under construction in 2005 for all kinds of structures, compared with 5.7 billion square feet in the United States.

As China grows—and clearly its manufacturing sector is fueling a very fast growth rate—we know its demand for services will increase even faster. This is good news for U.S. services businesses, because we are king of the global services providers, with an impressive array of sophisticated and high-quality products and services available for sale.

The size and wealth of our market and our tradition of consumer sovereignty have created the largest and most advanced service economy in the world, a fact reflected in our trade balance. We have consistently run a massive trade deficit—we have done so since the ’70s. Few, however, realize that we run a growing surplus in services trade. That surplus topped $70 billion in 2006, trimming down our overall trade deficit by over 8 percent. Perhaps more important, the positive services gap has been getting bigger.

The U.S. remains a major destination for international travelers, so it should come as no surprise that in the bookkeeping for our external account, travel is the largest private service we export. Lately, however, travel’s prominence in the statistics has been challenged by other higher-value-added services. Over the past decade, exports of travel, transportation and tourism have grown by 2.9 percent per year. By contrast, computer and information services and research and development have been growing at a double-digit pace. Similar stories abound. Our business services of accounting, auditing, management and consulting—along with insurance, finance and training—have increased mightily, thanks to technological advances that have made those services more tradable. With 16 percent of the world population plugged into the Internet and 41 percent using cell phones, many knowledge-based services can today be sold across the oceans through cyberspace at a fraction of traditional shipping costs.

America tends to export things that are high on the value-added ladder and import from lower down. In computer and information services, for example, we export $5.4 billion and import $2.2 billion. Dig deeper into the data and you will find that we largely export the services of systems architects and designers, while we import the services of basic programmers, who are the foot soldiers of the information economy. In services exports, as in manufacturing and agriculture, we are constantly moving up the value-added ladder.

We export twice as much intellectual property as we import. Our royalty and license fee income has been growing at 8 percent a year since 1992. Our exports of legal services have grown at 7 percent per year, and they now total nearly five times our imports. Exports of industrial engineering services have increased 18 percent per year since 1992, and we are now shipping out 13 times as much as we are receiving.

Our exports of film and TV rentals are 11 times greater than our imports. Of the 15 biggest-budget Hollywood movies made as of 2006, eight of them would have lost money if seen only in the U.S.—a total of $458 million in losses among them. However, when you include overseas sales, not only did all eight of them make money, but as a group they netted nearly $1.1 billion after production costs.

When I was deputy U.S. trade representative, the late, great Jack Valenti used to lobby me ferociously to negotiate the opening of foreign markets to U.S.-made films. His argument was as straight as Occam’s razor: Without the globalization of movies, studios would have had to scale back budgets, make smaller sets, use cruder animation, not-so-special effects and not-so-talented actors and actresses, and create otherwise less sophisticated and entertaining movies. Opening other countries’ markets to our movies would mean bigger and better movies for us to enjoy and more jobs created here at home. Jack was spot on. He would not have been the least bit surprised by the blockbuster revenues earned globally by Spiderman 3 over the past 10 days.

Here is the point: Be it in movies or industrial engineering design, in the service arena we are hotter than Scarlett Johansson. In high-value-added services, the United States holds a significant global competitive advantage.

The ubiquitous iPod tells the tale. Engraved on the back of my iPod are the words: “Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China.” As we send our services out into the world, send our designs to Chinese or Vietnamese or Mexican factories—factories we played a role in designing, by the way—or educate foreigners in our universities, or build R&D centers in India or Estonia or Israel, we are planting apple seeds all over the world. As long as those seeds are allowed to germinate and sprout into economic growth, the world will demand more of our value-added services. And as long as we here at home foster good economic conditions—including well-administered monetary policy—that allow our entrepreneurs to continue creating and selling services demanded globally, we will continue to create American jobs and enhance our prosperity.

I mention “well-administered monetary policy” deliberately. Obviously, the women and men who create and build our high-end economy work best when they are undistracted by inflation or other forms of economic turbulence. They can do their job best when we do our job best by administering monetary policy that underwrites sustainable noninflationary growth.

The shift to a service economy, however, has made the conduct of monetary policy both more difficult and easier. Let me touch on the challenges it poses for monetary policymakers.

The service sector is hard to measure. Services are intangible. The data for measuring the impact of services are more squishy than the relatively straightforward accounting for output in agriculture and the manufactured goods sector. To assess services, we must rely on surveys and the good judgment of the statisticians who interpret them.

There are sophisticated techniques for conducting these surveys. Yet when it comes to services, we cannot easily discern differences between quality improvements and inflationary price increases. This is less of an issue with goods, where we can more readily identify quality changes such as improvements in durability or serviceability. For example, improvements in automobiles are measured through the introduction of seatbelts, airbags and crash-worthy bumpers; the increased durability of engine and suspension components; electronic enhancements that improve fuel efficiency; better sound systems; voice-activated navigation systems and so on.

But in services, quality improvements are less clear. If your barber raises the price of a haircut, is it because you are getting a better haircut, or is it because the shop is passing on its increasing costs, or is there some other factor at play? I’m sure you’ve seen $15 haircuts at a strip-mall barbershop, and you’ve at least heard of hundred-dollar stylings offered by salons along Wisconsin Avenue. Four-hundred-dollar haircuts have been reported—even on the heads of Democrats. Presumably, there is a quality difference between them, but we can’t measure it the way we can with a ’67 Mustang and Ford’s 2007 model, or between the computing power of an old IBM mainframe and a modern Dell laptop.

This isn’t rocket science—it’s more challenging than that. In rocket science, the objective is defined and the process involves applying established mathematics. The value of services is less quantifiable, less well defined, and requires considerable judgment to distinguish between price changes resulting from inflationary pressures versus differences in quality.

Take what I do for a living as another example. Government agencies that measure employment and economic activity classify central banking under a broad category called “financial services—other.” It is a service. We serve the public by distributing cash and coin, maintaining an efficient payments system, supervising banks and setting monetary policy—what many might consider important functions. If we perform our services well, the economy keeps on humming, creating jobs and building wealth. If we fail, or just mess up every now and then, our missteps send ripples through the economy. Cash does not arrive at banks or checks don’t clear, inflation gains momentum or employment grows at a suboptimal rate. Yet I can’t point to where our success shows up in GDP statistics. Nor can I tell you how much more or less productive I am versus my predecessors or counterparts.

Our inability to fully distinguish between quality improvements and inflation in services means that when we look at growth in nominal GDP, we can’t be entirely sure how much results from the gains in real output and how much is inflation.

That is one set of issues. And there are others. In accounting for a knowledge-based economy, for example, the very concept of investment should be broader than the traditional focus on equipment and structures. U.S. government statisticians have already expanded the definition of business investment to include software. Arguably, they should be looking at education spending—which is the very foundation of our knowledge economy—in the same way, instead of counting education costs as a consumption expense.

The point is that in our efforts to assess the speed limit and engine temperature of the economy, we have plenty of gauges on our dashboard that we can use for evaluating the manufacturing sector. Yet we are deprived of similarly reliable gauges for measuring capacity utilization and other dynamics of the service sector. We spend a terrific amount of time analyzing domestic manufacturing reports—think of the media attention given to the Philadelphia Fed’s manufacturing index or the Empire State Index or, if you are astute, the Dallas Fed’s manufacturing index for a district—forgive my Texas brag—that produces more manufactured products than the areas covered by either the Philadelphia or New York surveys. Manufacturing data is so refined that I can tell you whether the plastic we make is used for a bag, bottle, pipe, pillow or floor. Yet, as our economy becomes ever more services-oriented, relying on traditional, goods-focused indicators as predictors of economic activity or inflection points in the business cycle becomes more and more suspect. As comparative advantages are redistributed by globalization, the importance of foreign capacity measurements for manufacturing increases. And the need for a services capacity metric here at home becomes imperative. And yet we—and this is a collective “we,” encompassing the economics profession worldwide, not just the Fed—have perfected neither.

Herein lies an opportunity for enterprising analysts to rise to the challenge I’ve just presented and profit from the development of new data that can help alleviate the deficiencies in service-sector metrics. Many—including our co-host this afternoon, the Coalition of Service Industries—draw well-deserved attention to our services sector, measuring its size, growth, scope and composition to drive home the point that the U.S. economy is services driven. While we can slice and dice the data we have, we still don’t have enough of it available to help us monitor trends with the level of detail and timeliness we have for our goods-producing sectors.

I’ll conclude by calling your attention to another aspect of the growing importance of services in the U.S. economy, a subtle, behind-the-scenes contribution that services are making to the decoupling of the overall economy from the manufacturing sector.

Allow me to draw your attention to Arthur Conan Doyle’s mystery, “Silver Blaze.” In that story, a Scotland Yard inspector asks Sherlock Holmes, “Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” Holmes replies, “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” Puzzled, the inspector notes, “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” “That was the curious incident,” Holmes says. The dog did not bark.

A “curious incident” happened in the U.S. economy during the 2001 downturn. Factory output fell by almost as much during that recession as in the 1981 recession 20 years earlier—7 percent in 2001 versus 8 percent in 1981. Yet, GDP declined by less than half a percentage point in the 2001 downturn versus 3 percent in 1981. The mystery is why the aggregate economy was so much less affected in 2001.

Undoubtedly, a significant part of the explanation is the sharply declining and relatively low real interest rates in the latter period, which helped sustain the construction industry. But it is also important to note the very different behavior of the goods component of GDP across the two episodes. In 1981, “total goods sector” output fell by the same amount as factory output. In 2001, it fell by only half the decline seen in manufacturing. To use the Holmes analogy, goods output “barked” loudly in 1981 in response to the collapse of manufacturing. In 2001, goods output merely whimpered.

This curious incident points to the solution to our mystery: What the Commerce Department calls “goods-sector output” in fact includes a growing retail and distribution services component that is relatively insensitive to fluctuations in factory production. This was the dog that did not bark. The merchandising services component of goods-sector output declined relatively little in 2001 and helped insulate the economy from the manufacturing collapse.

The service sector may not be as noisy or get as much analytical or political attention as the manufacturing sector, but it has a significant bite in terms of its impact on economic performance. That is the point to which I hope to have drawn your attention today. As we seek to conduct monetary policy, we will have to develop new methods for determining exactly how the service sector's bite affects the business cycle and economic behavior.

Enough said. Thank you for listening. Let’s stop there, and in the best interest of being transparent, I will do my best to mumble and stammer through responses to your questions.

About the Author

Richard W. Fisher is president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Note

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.

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삼성전자 조만간 사장단 인사 난다고? [서울=뉴스핌] 서영욱 기자 = 삼성전자가 이르면 이번 주 정기 사장단 인사를 단행할 것으로 예상되는 가운데 이재용 삼성전자 회장의 성과주의 인사 원칙에 재계의 관심이 쏠린다. 반도체 사업이 사상 최대 실적을 경신한 반면 완제품 사업은 두 분기 연속 적자를 기록하면서 성과에 따른 보상과 쇄신의 필요성이 동시에 커졌기 때문이다. 다만 인공지능(AI) 확산과 메모리 가격 급등이라는 동일한 시장 환경이 두 부문의 실적에 상반된 영향을 미쳤다는 점에서 경영진에 대한 평가가 단순하지만은 않다. 반도체 사업은 호황을 지속할 수 있는 경쟁력을 확보해야 하고 완제품 사업은 기존 수익구조의 한계를 극복해야 하는 상황이다. 이 회장이 현재의 경영 성과와 미래의 성장 가능성에 어느 정도 비중을 두느냐에 따라 삼성의 차세대 경영진 구도도 달라질 전망이다. 서울 서초구 삼성전자 서초사옥 [사진 = 뉴스핌DB] 16일 재계에 따르면 삼성전자는 조만간 2027년도 정기 사장단 인사를 시작으로 임원 인사와 조직개편을 순차적으로 단행할 전망이다. 지난해 11월 21일 단행한 사장단 인사에서는 사장 승진자가 1명에 그치는 등 경영 안정에 방점이 찍혔다. 전영현 디바이스솔루션(DS)부문장 부회장과 노태문 디바이스경험(DX)부문장 사장의 2인 대표이사 체제를 구축하고 각각 메모리사업부장과 모바일경험(MX)사업부장을 겸직하도록 했다. 올해는 두 부문의 실적 격차가 극단적으로 벌어졌다. 삼성전자는 올해 3분기 107조4000억원의 영업이익을 기록했다. DS부문이 106조5000억원의 영업이익을 올린 반면 DX부문은 8000억원의 영업손실을 내며 두 분기 연속 적자를 기록했다. [AI 인포그래픽=서영욱 기자] ◆ 반도체 재건 이끈 전영현…성과주의 승진 기대감반도체 사업을 재건한 전 부회장은 유임에 무게가 실린다. 전 부회장은 고대역폭메모리(HBM) 경쟁력 약화로 삼성전자 위기론이 확산하던 지난 2024년 5월 구원투수로 등판했다. 같은 해 11월 메모리사업부장까지 겸직하며 기술 경쟁력 회복을 진두지휘했다. 삼성전자는 올해 HBM4 양산과 판매 확대에 성공하며 인공지능(AI) 반도체 시장에서 경쟁력을 회복했다. 범용 메모리 가격 상승까지 맞물리면서 반도체 사업의 수익성도 크게 높아졌다. 관건은 전 부회장이 메모리사업부장 겸직을 내려놓을지 여부다. 메모리 사업이 정상화 궤도에 오른 만큼 후임 사업부장을 발탁하고 전 부회장은 파운드리(반도체 위탁생산)와 첨단 패키징, 대규모 시설투자 등 DS부문 전반의 경쟁력 강화에 집중할 가능성이 제기된다. 차기 메모리사업부장 후보로는 송재혁 DS부문 최고기술책임자(CTO) 사장과 황상준 메모리개발담당 부사장, 김재준 전략마케팅실장 부사장 등이 거론된다. 송 사장은 반도체연구소장을 겸직하며 차세대 반도체 기술과 공정 개발을 이끌어 온 인물이다. 황 부사장은 D램과 낸드플래시 개발을 총괄하며 메모리 기술 경쟁력 회복에 기여했다. 김 부사장은 글로벌 고객사 대응과 고부가가치 메모리 판매 확대를 담당해 왔다. AI 반도체 시장의 성장으로 메모리 사업에서 기술 개발 못지않게 영업·마케팅의 중요성도 커지고 있다. 글로벌 빅테크를 중심으로 수년 치 물량을 선점하려는 장기공급계약이 확산하면서 우수한 제품을 개발하는 것뿐 아니라 대형 고객사를 확보하고 안정적인 수익 기반을 구축하는 역량도 중요해졌기 때문이다. 삼성전자는 이미 대형 고객사 10곳과 장기공급계약을 체결했으며 추가로 10곳과 협상을 진행 중이다. 차세대 메모리 기술 주도권 확보와 글로벌 고객사 확대가 모두 중요한 과제로 떠오른 만큼 기술 전문가와 영업·마케팅 전문가 중 누구에게 메모리사업부의 지휘봉을 맡길지가 관전 포인트다. 비메모리 사업은 사정이 다르다. 2024년 말 파운드리사업부장에 오른 한진만 사장은 북미 반도체 사업을 총괄하며 쌓은 경험을 바탕으로 테슬라 등 대형 고객사를 확보했다. 2나노 공정 수주 확대와 미국 테일러 공장 가동 등 주요 사업 과제가 진행 중이라는 점에서 경영의 연속성에 무게가 실린다. 반면 2022년부터 시스템LSI사업부를 이끌고 있는 박용인 사장은 모바일 애플리케이션 프로세서(AP) 경쟁력 강화와 수익성 개선이라는 과제를 안고 있다. 맞춤형 반도체 등으로 사업 영역을 확대하는 과정에서 새로운 리더십을 발탁할 가능성도 배제할 수 없다. [AI 인포그래픽=서영욱 기자] ◆ 적자 직면한 노태문…완제품 사업 체질 개선 과제DX부문은 대규모 승진보다 사업 경쟁력 회복을 위한 쇄신에 무게가 실릴 전망이다. 노 사장은 지난해 3월 한종희 부회장의 갑작스러운 별세로 DX부문장 직무대행을 맡은 뒤 같은 해 11월 정식 부문장에 올랐다. 갤럭시 스마트폰의 글로벌 성장을 이끌어 온 노 사장에게 주어진 새로운 임무는 TV와 생활가전까지 아우르는 완제품 사업 전반의 경쟁력 강화였다. 그러나 중국 기업들의 추격이 거세진 데다 메모리 등 주요 부품 가격까지 급등하면서 수익성 확보에 어려움을 겪고 있다. 노 사장이 정식 부문장에 오른 지 1년밖에 지나지 않았다는 점에서 유임 가능성이 높지만 부회장 승진을 뒷받침할 실적 명분은 상대적으로 약해졌다는 평가다. 노 사장 역시 MX사업부장 겸직을 해제하고 DX부문 전체의 체질 개선에 집중할 가능성이 있다. 후임으로 거론되는 최원준 MX사업부 최고운영책임자(COO) 사장은 미국 퀄컴 출신으로 갤럭시 스마트폰의 기술 혁신과 AI 기능 고도화를 주도해 왔다. 지난해 사장으로 승진한 데 이어 COO를 맡으며 모바일 사업 전반으로 역할을 확대했다. TV 사업에서는 이미 쇄신 인사가 이뤄졌다. 삼성전자는 지난 5월 용석우 영상디스플레이사업부장을 DX부문장 보좌역으로 이동시키고 이원진 사장을 후임으로 선임했다. 개발 전문가 대신 콘텐츠·서비스 전문가를 사업부장에 배치하며 하드웨어 판매 중심의 수익구조를 다변화하겠다는 의지를 드러냈다. 이원진 사장의 역할이 한층 확대될 가능성도 주목된다. 구글 출신의 광고·서비스 전문가인 이 사장은 2014년 삼성전자에 영입된 뒤 삼성 TV 플러스 등 서비스 사업을 성장시키며 2021년 사장으로 승진했다. 2023년 말 상담역으로 물러났지만 1년 만에 글로벌마케팅실장으로 화려하게 복귀한 데 이어 올해 위기에 빠진 TV 사업의 구원투수로 등판했다. 이 사장은 지난해에 이어 올해 상반기에도 삼성전자 현직 임원 가운데 가장 많은 보수(74억7900만원)를 받으며 입지를 다졌다. DX부문이 하드웨어 판매 중심의 사업구조에서 벗어나 광고와 콘텐츠, 구독 등 서비스 중심으로 수익원을 다변화해야 하는 상황인 만큼 이 사장의 역할이 TV 사업을 넘어 완제품 사업 전반의 체질 개선으로 확대될 가능성도 있다. 이재용 삼성전자 회장 [사진 = 뉴스핌DB] ◆ 사업지원실 출범 1년…이재용의 용인술 주목그룹의 컨트롤타워 역할을 하는 사업지원실의 변화 여부도 관심사다. 이 회장은 지난해 11월 사업지원태스크포스(TF)를 정식 조직인 사업지원실로 전환하고 정현호 부회장을 회장 보좌역으로 이동시켰다. 후임 실장에는 재무 전문가인 박학규 사장을 선임하고 최윤호 사장에게 전략팀장을 맡겼다. 인수합병(M&A)팀도 신설했다. 반도체 사업을 통해 확보한 막대한 투자 재원을 미래 성장동력 확보에 투입해야 하는 상황에서 박 사장의 부회장 승진 여부와 사업지원실의 역할 확대도 주요 관전 포인트다. AI와 로봇, 첨단 패키징 등 미래 사업을 이끌 기술 인재의 발탁 기조도 이어질 전망이다. 삼성전자는 지난해 윤장현 삼성벤처투자 대표를 사장으로 승진시켜 DX부문 CTO 겸 삼성리서치장으로 선임하고 하버드대 교수 출신인 박홍근 사장을 삼성전자 종합기술원(SAIT) 원장으로 영입했다. 부사장 승진자도 2024년 35명에서 지난해 51명으로 늘리며 차세대 경영진 후보군을 확대했다. 다만 이번 인사에서는 반도체와 완제품 사업의 실적 격차를 경영진의 역량 차이로만 평가하기 어렵다는 점이 변수다. DS부문의 사상 최대 실적은 HBM 경쟁력 회복이라는 자체적인 성과에 AI 인프라 투자 확대와 메모리 공급 부족에 따른 가격 상승이 맞물린 결과다. 반면 DX부문은 중국 기업들과의 경쟁이 심화하는 상황에서 메모리 가격 급등으로 스마트폰과 TV 등 주요 제품의 제조원가까지 상승하는 이중고를 겪고 있다. 제품 가격을 인상하면 판매량과 시장점유율 하락을 감수해야 하고, 가격을 유지하면 수익성이 악화될 수밖에 없는 상황이다. 같은 시장 환경이 두 부문의 실적에 상반된 영향을 미친 만큼 외부 요인에 따른 실적 증감과 경영진이 실제로 창출한 성과를 어떻게 구분해 인사에 반영할지가 이 회장의 고민이 될 것으로 보인다. 성과급을 둘러싼 두 부문의 내부 갈등도 이 회장의 부담이다. DX부문 중심의 노동조합은 지난 5일 수원사업장 앞에서 집회를 열고 공정한 보상체계 마련과 경영진의 책임을 촉구했다. 재계 관계자는 "성과를 낸 인재에게는 확실한 보상을 하고 부진한 사업에는 새로운 돌파구를 마련할 수 있는 인재를 배치하는 것이 성과주의 인사의 핵심"이라며 "사상 최대 실적에도 사업 간 불균형이 심화한 상황에서 이 회장이 단기적인 경영 성과와 미래 성장 가능성을 어떻게 평가하느냐에 따라 삼성의 향후 경영 방향도 가늠할 수 있을 것"이라고 말했다. syu@newspim.com 2026-11-16 10:21
사진
젠슨 황, 사퇴 나흘 만에 복귀 시도하나 [시드니=뉴스핌] 권지언 특파원 = 젠슨 황 전 엔비디아 최고경영자(CEO)가 측근들과 CEO 복귀 가능성을 논의한 것으로 알려졌다. 실리콘밸리 주요 인사들도 황 전 CEO의 복귀를 위해 이사회 설득에 나서면서 엔비디아의 리더십 위기를 둘러싼 논란이 확산하는 모습이다. 15일(현지시각) 파이낸셜타임스(FT)는 사안에 정통한 복수의 관계자를 인용해 황 전 CEO가 측근들과 복귀 가능성을 논의했다고 보도했다. 황 전 CEO는 중국 스파이로 의심되는 인물 및 부하 직원과의 부적절한 관계 의혹이 제기된 뒤 사임했다. 엔비디아 이사회는 사임을 초래한 행위와 관련해 독립적인 조사를 진행 중이다. 황 전 CEO의 한 측근은 FT에 실리콘밸리 경영진들로 구성된 이른바 '워룸(war room)'을 꾸려 그의 복귀를 위한 로비에 나서고 있다고 밝혔다. 백악관의 지지를 확보하는 방안도 추진할 예정이다. 이 측근은 "최첨단 AI 연구소들을 제외하면 기술업계에서 영향력 있는 인사들은 모두 젠슨을 좋아한다"고 말했다. 복귀를 위한 움직임 역시 황 전 CEO의 지지를 받고 있다고 덧붙였다. 황 전 CEO의 복귀를 촉구하는 공개 캠페인도 확산하고 있다. 일론 머스크 테슬라·스페이스X CEO와 팀 스위니 에픽게임즈 CEO 등은 엔비디아 이사회에 황 전 CEO의 복귀를 요구하는 공개서한에 지지를 표명했다. 일부 엔비디아 직원들도 사임 이후 공개적으로 복귀를 요구하며 해당 서한에 서명한 것으로 전해졌다. ◆ 美 정부는 경영진 쇄신 요구…복귀 움직임에 제동 다만 복귀 추진은 워싱턴 주요 정책 당국자들의 반발에 부딪힐 가능성이 크다. 스콧 베선트 미 재무장관은 이날 황 전 CEO의 사임 이후 엔비디아 경영진의 '대대적인 쇄신'이 필요하다고 촉구했다. 황 전 CEO는 다른 창업자 겸 CEO들과 달리 지배 지분을 보유하고 있지 않아 이사회의 결정을 뒤집을 수 없는 처지다. 현재 임시 CEO인 콜레트 크레스가 이끄는 경영진은 오는 화요일 분기 실적 발표를 앞두고 경영 안정화에 주력하고 있다. 이번 사태는 중국과 연계 가능성이 있는 아시아 고객 대상 AI 칩 판매와 관련한 엔비디아의 준법 감시 체계에 대한 의문으로도 번지고 있다. 황 전 CEO가 싱가포르 소재 메가스피드의 임원 앨리스 황과 부적절한 관계를 맺었다는 의혹이 제기되면서, 칩 판매 과정에서 적절한 통제가 이뤄졌는지를 둘러싼 감시의 눈초리가 커지고 있다고 FT는 전했다. 황 전 CEO의 복귀를 추진하는 측근들 사이에서도 그의 평판을 회복하기가 쉽지 않다는 우려가 나온다. 복귀 추진에 관여한 한 관계자는 "부하 직원과의 불륜은 해고 사유에 해당한다"고 인정했다. 후임 CEO 후보군에도 관심이 쏠린다. FT는 앞서 금요일 엔비디아 이사회가 ARM의 르네 하스 CEO에게 후임자 후보로 접촉했다고 보도했다. 다만 엔비디아 이사회는 아직 공식적인 CEO 선임 절차가 시작된 것은 아니라고 밝혔다. 엔비디아 주요 주주인 알티미터 캐피털의 브래드 거스트너 창업자와 아트레이즈 매니지먼트의 개빈 베이커 대표도 금요일 공개서한을 통해 이사회에 황 전 CEO의 복귀 가능성을 포함한 모든 선택지를 열어둘 것을 촉구했다. 이들은 황 전 CEO의 장기간에 걸친 탁월한 경영 성과와 사임을 둘러싼 불확실성을 고려해야 한다고 강조했다. 엔비디아와 황 전 CEO 측은 관련 논평을 거부했다. 엔비디아 젠슨 황 최고경영자(CEO) [사진=블룸버그통신] kwonjiun@newspim.com 2026-11-16 05:39
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